Reciprocity and Giving in a Consecutive Three-Person Dictator Game with Social Interaction

Bahr Gunter and Requate Till
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Bahr Gunter: Department of Economics, Kiel University,Kiel, Germany
Requate Till: Olshausenstraße Kiel University,Kiel, Germany

German Economic Review, 2014, vol. 15, issue 3, 374-392

Abstract: We study pure indirect reciprocity by setting up a modified dictator game with three players A, B, and C acting sequentially. Subject A takes a share of a pie and passes the rest to subject B, while B divides the rest between herself and C. We find that this consecutive three-person dictator game increases generosity compared with the traditional two-person dictator game. We analyze the influence of social interaction and uncertainty. In treatments with certainty we observe pure indirect reciprocity: B indirectly reciprocates for A’s behavior in the decision on how generous to be to C.

Keywords: Pure indirect reciprocity; dictator game; social interaction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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DOI: 10.1111/geer.12013

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