Political affiliation in post-parliamentary careers in Italian public enterprises

Quaresima Federico (), Raffaella Santolini and Fiorillo Fabio ()
Additional contact information
Quaresima Federico: Department of Economics and Social Sciences, 9294Polytechnic University of Marche, P. le Martelli, 8, 60121, Ancona, Italy
Fiorillo Fabio: Department of Economics and Social Sciences, 9294Polytechnic University of Marche, P. le Martelli, 8, 60121, Ancona, Italy

German Economic Review, 2020, vol. 21, issue 1, 35-64

Abstract: It has long been recognized that the presence of politicians on the boards of directors of public firms may create inefficiencies. Nevertheless, research has so far neglected the effect of political affiliation on the appointment of Members of Parliament to the boards of public firms. This article intends to fill this gap by conducting an empirical analysis on a sample of 945 deputies of the Italian Parliament elected over the period 1996–2001. Regression discontinuity estimates show that the centre-left coalition is about 25 percentage points more likely to appoint its Members of Parliament to the board of public enterprises than the centre-right coalition. Political appointments become more pronounced when the centre-left forms a governing coalition.

Keywords: party affiliation; political appointment; public enterprises; regression discontinuity design; Italy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 H82 J45 L32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1515/ger-0016-0019 (text/html)
For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:germec:v:21:y:2020:i:1:p:35-64

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.degruyter.com/journal/key/ger/html

DOI: 10.1515/ger-0016-0019

Access Statistics for this article

German Economic Review is currently edited by Peter Egger, Almut Balleer, Jesus Crespo-Cuaresma, Mario Larch, Aderonke Osikominu and Georg Wamser

More articles in German Economic Review from De Gruyter
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Peter Golla ().