Non-cooperative vs. Minimum- Rate Commodity Taxation

Hvidt Morten and Søren Nielsen
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Hvidt Morten: University of Copenhagen,Copenhagen, Denmark

German Economic Review, 2001, vol. 2, issue 4, 315-326

Abstract: This paper demonstrates, within a simple two-country model of commodity taxation and cross-border shopping, that the tax revenue (welfare) effects of a minimum tax requirement depend crucially on the character of the initial non-cooperative tax equilibrium, i.e. whether it is Nash or Stackelberg.

Date: 2001
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Related works:
Journal Article: Non‐cooperative vs. Minimum‐Rate Commodity Taxation (2001)
Working Paper: NONCOOPERATIVE vs MINIMUM-RATE COMMODITY TAXATION (2000)
Working Paper: Noncooperative vs. Minimum-Rate Commodity Taxation
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DOI: 10.1111/1468-0475.00042

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