Bioethics, Rent-Seeking, and Death: Examining the Opposition to Kidney Markets

Lemennicier Bertrand and Wenzel Nikolai G. ()
Additional contact information
Lemennicier Bertrand: Center for Research in Law and Economics (CRED), Université Panthéon-Assas, Paris, France
Wenzel Nikolai G.: Center for Research in Law and Economics (CRED), Université Panthéon-Assas, Paris, France

Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, 2021, vol. 27, issue 1, 51-74

Abstract: The market for kidneys offers a case study of Baptists and Bootleggers. In almost every country, sales are currently illegal and donated organs are allocated by a central planner. Thousands of people die every year, because of the shortage caused by the absence of markets. This paper starts by examining the free-market alternative, and shows that a market would solve the shortage (and thus unnecessary deaths). It then uses gains-from-trade analysis to explain why current vested interests oppose a move to a market, despite the immense potential for saved lives. In a shift to a market, gains from trade would be distributed away from lucky patients (who receive a zero-price kidney) and various industries that benefit from the shortage (dialysis, medical equipment, etc.); these “Bootleggers” form an alliance with “Baptists” (altruistic donors, large segments of the bioethics community, and organ allocation central planners).

Keywords: bioethics; kidney markets; organ markets; rent-seeking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 I11 I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1515/jeeh-2020-0005 (text/html)
For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:jeehcn:v:27:y:2021:i:1:p:51-74:n:4

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.degruyter.com/journal/key/jeeh/html

DOI: 10.1515/jeeh-2020-0005

Access Statistics for this article

Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines is currently edited by Pierre Garello

More articles in Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines from De Gruyter
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Peter Golla ().