Behavioral Economics and Court Decision-Making

Teichman Doron () and Zamir Eyal
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Teichman Doron: The Hebrew University of Jerusalem Faculty of Law, Jerusalem 9190501, Israel
Zamir Eyal: The Hebrew University of Jerusalem Faculty of Law, Jerusalem 9190501, Israel

Review of Law & Economics, 2021, vol. 17, issue 2, 385-418

Abstract: The economic analysis of law assumes that court decisions are key to incentivizing people and maximizing social welfare. This article reviews the behavioral literature on court decision making, and highlights numerous heuristics and biases that impact judges and jurors and cause them to make decisions that diverge from the social optimum. In light of this review, the article analyzes some of the institutional features of the court system that may help minimize the costs of biased decisions in the courts.

Keywords: behavioral law and economics; judicial decision making; anchoring; hindsight bias; debias (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K00 K41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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DOI: 10.1515/rle-2021-0058

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