Are Academics Messy? Testing the Broken Windows Theory with a Field Experiment in the Work Environment
Ramos Joao and
Torgler Benno ()
Additional contact information
Ramos Joao: PricewaterhouseCoopers Australia
Torgler Benno: Queensland University of Technology
Review of Law & Economics, 2012, vol. 8, issue 3, 563-577
Abstract:
We test the broken windows theory using a field experiment in a shared area of an academic workplace (the department common room). More specifically, we explore academics’ and postgraduate students’ behavior under an order condition (a clean environment) and a disorder condition (a messy environment). We find strong evidence that signs of disorderly behavior trigger littering: In 59% of the cases, subjects litter in the disorder treatment as compared to 18% in the order condition. These results remain robust in a multivariate analysis even when controlling for a large set of factors not directly examined by previous studies. Overall, when academic staff and postgraduate students observe that others have violated the social norm of keeping the common room clean, all else being equal, the probability of littering increases by around 40%.
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1515/1555-5879.1617 (text/html)
For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.
Related works:
Working Paper: Are Academics Messy? Testing the Broken Windows Theory with a Field Experiment in the Work Environment (2010) 
Working Paper: Are Academics Messy? Testing the Broken Windows Theory with a Field Experiment in the Work Environment (2009) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:8:y:2012:i:3:p:563-577:n:7
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.degruyter.com/journal/key/rle/html
DOI: 10.1515/1555-5879.1617
Access Statistics for this article
Review of Law & Economics is currently edited by Francesco Parisi
More articles in Review of Law & Economics from De Gruyter
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Peter Golla ().