The Economics of IPR Protection Policies: Reply

Ricard Gil

Review of Network Economics, 2007, vol. 6, issue 4, 5

Abstract: In a comment to my paper "The Economics of IPR Protection Policies," Martínez-Sánchez (2007) shows that in my model under certain conditions the presence of piracy increases the quantity produced by the legal monopolist firm. In this note, I show how the algebra used in Martínez-Sánchez (2007) may be misleading and clarify under what assumptions such a finding would emerge. Finally, I discuss the validity of the assumptions in my model that would yield such counterintuitive finding.

Date: 2007
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DOI: 10.2202/1446-9022.1134

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