The Curious Incident of the Bidder in the Nighttime

Kathryn Graddy (), Jianping Mei () and Michael Moses ()

No 138, Working Papers from Brandeis University, Department of Economics and International Business School

Abstract: This paper shows that buyers pay a substantial premium during evening auctions at major auction houses. For Post-War paintings, evening estimate premiums exceed 70%, and buyers pay over 5% above these estimates. While higher estimates reduce the likelihood of sale, inclusion inan evening auction increases it. We also examine the interaction of evening sales and lot ordering, finding that for high-valued paintings, sellers may fare better earlier in a day auction than later in an evening sale. These results highlight how auction timing and pricing strategies affect both sale probabilities and final prices in the art market.

Pages: 37
Date: 2025-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:brd:wpaper:138

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