Production extended research joint ventures and welfare

Gianluca Femminis and Gianmaria Martini

No 809, Working Papers from Department of Management, Information and Production Engineering, University of Bergamo

Abstract: A wider RJV extension hastens process innovations at the cost of increasing collusion in the .nal market. In a Cournot model, an extended RJV is welfare enhancing only when the Antitrust Authority is strong, so that the increase in distortion is limited, and when the size of the technical improvement is large, so that the introduction of the innovation is more valuable.

Keywords: RJV; R&D; collusion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 L41 O33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:brh:wpaper:0809

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