The Production Function for Votes

John Maloney and Andrew Pickering

Bristol Economics Discussion Papers from School of Economics, University of Bristol, UK

Abstract: The Vote Production Function (VPF) has a party's vote depending on (a) its potential vote and (b) the party organization which actualizes it - 'political capital'. Empirical work suggests that moving to the centre would increase your vote if only you could hold political capital constant. The relative weights of the factors in the VPF will determine whether parties converge or polarize ideologically and politicians' rent-seeking behaviour. In most cases, the more important political capital is, the greater the extent of rent seeking. There is thus a welfare case for sidelining party organizations. Compulsory voting might help.

Keywords: voting; ideological equilibria; rent-seeking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H10 H11 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 42 pages
Date: 2004-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bri:uobdis:04/559

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