Political selection of public servants and parliamentary oversight

Thomas Braendle and Alois Stutzer

Working papers from Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel

Abstract: In this paper, we integrate the identity of legislators in a politico-economic analysis of parliamentary oversight whereby oversight activities depend on individual control costs and incentives. We focus on public servants selected into parliament who face a conflict of interests but also have lower control costs due to their experience and information advantage. If held accountable, oversight becomes a relatively attractive activity for them to win votes. Based on a novel data set for German Laender, we find that the fraction of public servants in parliament is positively related to the number of submitted parliamentary interpellations.

Keywords: Political selection; parliamentary oversight; public servants; interpellations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D73 H11 H83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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https://edoc.unibas.ch/26667/1/ParliamentaryOversight_12May10.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Political selection of public servants and parliamentary oversight (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bsl:wpaper:2010/08

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