A critical note on the scientific conception of economics: claiming for a methodological pluralism
Rouven Reinke ()
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Rouven Reinke: University of Hamburg (Germany)
The Journal of Philosophical Economics, 2021, vol. 14, issue 1-2, 108-135
Abstract:
Opponents of mainstream economics have not yet called attention to the lack of in-depth examination of the general scientific conception of modern economics. However, economic science cannot consistently fulfil the epistemological and ontological requirements of the scientific standards underlying this conception. What can be scientifically recognized as true cannot be answered, neither through the actual ontological structure of the object of observation nor through a methodological demarcation. These limitations necessarily lead to the claim for both a pragmatic and a radical methodological pluralism.
Keywords: pluralism; scientific conception; mainstream economics; methodology; [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance; [SHS.HISPHILSO]Humanities and Social Sciences/History; Philosophy and Sociology of Sciences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bus:jphile:v:13:y:2021:i:1-2:n:4
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