Le contrôle de gestion dans un hôpital public: un modèle de transactions « diagonales »

Marie-Claude Masse

ACCRA, 1996, vol. 2, issue 1, 21-43

Abstract: The principal-agent model has frequently been used for assessing the usefulness of budget-based contracts. This theoretical approach is too limited for the context of management control in a public hospital. To overcome its limitations, a theoretical extension is proposed described as the "diagonal" transactions model. The argument establishes the importance of risk-sharing and incentive agreements within a professional bureaucracy and its context of asymmetric information flows. Finally, this theoretic development is situated in relation to studies of bureaucracies using the informal transactions model.

Keywords: agency theory; management control; budget; professional bureaucracy; informal transactions model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996
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