Gestion du bénéfice à la suite d'une crise environnementale un test de l'hypothèse des coûts politiques

Réal Labelle and Marc Thibault

ACCRA, 1998, vol. 4, issue 1, 69-81

Abstract: Major environmental crises have disastrous effects on political visibility of the firms involved. Loss of life and social or external costs derived from such disasters attract public attention to those firms. Government may be induced to discipline managers by forcing them to incur costs to clean up and reduce the risk of accident. This paper uses the political costs related to 10 major environmental crises and a model similar to Jones 1991, Cahan 1992, and DeAngelo et al. 1994 to conduct on a longitudinal and cross-sectional basis an empirical test of the political-cost hypothesis where size is replaced by occurrence of an environmental crisis. The signs of all variables in the model match the predicted sign and are significant except for the proxy for environmental crises.

Keywords: environmental crises; political costs; political visibility; earnings management (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cairn.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=CCA_041_0069 (application/pdf)
http://www.cairn.info/revue-comptabilite-controle-audit-1998-1-page-69.htm (text/html)
free

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cai:accafc:cca_041_0069

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in ACCRA from Association francophone de comptabilité
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jean-Baptiste de Vathaire ().