Qualité de l'audit et gouvernement d'entreprise: le rôle et les limites de la concurrence sur le marché de l'audit

Benoît Pigé

ACCRA, 2000, vol. 6, issue 2, 133-151

Abstract: The firms? performance is largely dependent of its corporate governance. One main determinant of the corporate governance quality is the level of the information asymetry between the shareholders, the board and the top managers. With a review of the main American researches conducted on the quality and independence of the auditors, we suggest that, in France, a greater concurrence between the auditors would contribute to a better corporate governance. This hypothesis is confirmed by the analysis of rents constitution and by the examination of their consequences on the French audit market.

Keywords: performance; audit; corporate governance; concurrence; information asymetry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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