Les comités spécialisés des entreprises françaises cotées: mécanismes de gouvernance ou simples dispositifs esthétiques ?

Christine Pochet and Heejung Yeo

ACCRA, 2004, vol. 10, issue 2, 31-53

Abstract: The formation of monitoring committees (e.g. audit, compensation, and selection) within boards of directors is one of the recommendations Anglo-Saxon institutional investors have brought to France. We question, however, the potential for such committees to meet the expectations of those investors. The empirical study conducted on a sample of 120 listed firms indicates that, in the French context, the formation of monitoring committees can only partly be interpreted in terms of a device aimed at reducing agency costs.

Keywords: corporate governance; board of directors; committees; Anglo-Saxon institutional investors (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cairn.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=CCA_102_0031 (application/pdf)
http://www.cairn.info/revue-comptabilite-controle-audit-2004-2-page-31.htm (text/html)
free

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cai:accafc:cca_102_0031

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in ACCRA from Association francophone de comptabilité
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jean-Baptiste de Vathaire ().