Financement des politiques du marché du travail et protection de l'emploi

Olivier L’Haridon
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Olivier L'Haridon

Economie & Prévision, 2005, vol. 168, issue 2, 43-62

Abstract: This article focuses on the links between the form of employment protection and two elementsof the labour marketpoliciesbudget: unemployment benefits and hiring subsidies. We study the complementarities of such policies in a standard matching model of employment. Inour model two types of employment protection reforms are investigated: a reform of the existing job protection policies in Europe (regulatory costs of lay-offs) and the introduction of a US-style ?experience rating scheme?. Our simulations show that the design of job protection is a crucial parameter in determining the effect of these policies on unemployment and interacts strongly with the unemployment benefit financing policy. The results suggest that the complementarities between job protection and unemployment benefit policies depend heavily on the precise form of the employment protection.

Keywords: job protection; experience rating; complementarities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Financement des politiques du marché du travail et protection de l'emploi (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cai:ecoldc:ecop_168_0043

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