The Nuclear Safety Authority in France: A Dogma of “Independence” and Institutional Fragility

Saliha Hadna

Journal of Innovation Economics, 2017, vol. n° 22, issue 1, 119-144

Abstract: The fragility of the independence of the Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) is underlined by demonstrating the inadequacy of the parameters which are intended to protect it. Secondly, the focus is placed on transparency, presented by the safety authority as an acquired value. This transparency is in fact very limited. But, in particular, the ?provision of information? is not a sufficient condition of transparency. Finally, by using the illustrative case of the mine tailings census (Borloo circular, 2009), it is assumed that the economic logic strongly limits the conditions of production of technical knowledge for information purposes. JEL Codes: O30, K32, L16

Keywords: Nuclear Safety Authority; independence; transparency; technical ignorance; strategic ignorance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K32 L16 O30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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