Les transformations de la structure financière du grand patronat tunisien

Mohamed Oubenal

Mondes en développement, 2022, vol. n° 198, issue 2, 37-54

Abstract: In this article, we study the relationship between political power and private capital in Tunisia by analyzing the evolution of interlocking directorates of listed companies. During the Ben Ali era, a system of sanctions (supported by central board members linked to the Ben Ali-Trabelsi clan) enabled the control of private business groups. After the 2011 uprising, important family groups adopted a strategy of acquiring positions in the financial sector and benefited from the seizure of the assets of the president?s clan. The network analysis also shows the centrality of new actors who have financial technocrat profile.

Keywords: Network analysis; corporate governance; business elites; Tunisia; interlocking directorates; finance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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