Externalités budgétaires et choix du banquier central dans une union monétaire. La délégation comme solution coopérative de second rang

Pierre-Henri Faure

Revue économique, 2001, vol. 52, issue 1, 35-60

Abstract: In a monetary union, the incentives of national authorities to misrepresent their true preferences still exist in the absence of time inconsistency issues. With fiscal spillovers among countries, delegating the control of monetary policy to a central banker with a different output-inflation trade-off is a second-best form of fiscal co-ordination and raises welfare. A populist governor (less inflation averse) may outperform a ceiling on fiscal deficits. Classification JEL : E58, E61, E63

JEL-codes: E58 E61 E63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Journal Article: Externalités budgétaires et choix du banquier central dans une union monétaire. La délégation comme solution coopérative de second rang (2001)
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