Taille du système de retraite par répartition et âge optimal de départ à la retraite

Patrick Artus

Revue économique, 2001, vol. 52, issue 4, 773-790

Abstract: We examine the determination of the optimal (from the point of view of social welfare) retirement age. We analyze the relationship between the choice of the retirement age and the choice of the nature of the pension system (relative shares of the pay-as-you-go and of the capitalized system). We compare two situations: in the first one, the retirement age is compulsory and chosen by the authorities; in the second one, wage-earners can freely decide to retire later, which increases the level of the pension they will get for a given level of contribution to the pay-as-you-go system. We use a theoretical overlapping generations model, where consumers choose between consumption and leisure, and where the authorities maximize social welfare using two instruments: retirement age (at least in the case they can freely choose it); the structure of the pension system. We show in particular that wage earners spontaneously choose to retire too late (from the point of view of welfare), since they ignore the link between retirement age, real wages and real interest rates. Classification JEL : H55, J26

JEL-codes: H55 J26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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