La rationalité de la non-spécialisation dans les ménages. Une rupture avec la théorie beckérienne

Anne Bustreel

Revue économique, 2001, vol. 52, issue 6, 1157-1183

Abstract: Microeconomic models imply that a sexual division of labor is optimal within ?cooperative? families. This paper questions the assumption that household decisions are made cooperatively. Then, it proposes a non cooperative model to study intra-household allocation of time. Within this model, non specialization can be more and more often optimal when the relative cost of specialization and the divorce probability rise. Classification JEL : D1, J22

JEL-codes: D1 J22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cairn.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=RECO_526_1157 (application/pdf)
http://www.cairn.info/revue-economique-2001-6-page-1157.htm (text/html)
free

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_526_1157

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Revue économique from Presses de Sciences-Po
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jean-Baptiste de Vathaire ().