L'arbitrage coût-disponibilité du crédit et la concentration de la dette. Une approche en termes de contrats séparants

Frédéric Lobez and Jean-Christophe Statnik

Revue économique, 2001, vol. 52, issue 6, 1227-1250

Abstract: In this work, we built a model of bank-enterprise relationships in an adverse selection situation. The informational problem is resolved by a double device. First, firms choose the number of potential lenders, then banks deduce some information of debtors?quality, therefore, we obtain a semi-separating equilibrium. On the other hand, banks complete the solution of informational problem by using separating contracts where the separation is based on the pair (rate; likelihood of rationing). Then the model permits to link the debt concentration, the credit cost and the credit availability to the firm?s risk. So, we show that more risky firms prefer fewer number of potential lenders. On the contrary, the fewer risky firms prefer more potential lenders: they limit the possibility of credit rationing. Classification JEL : G21

JEL-codes: G21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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