Entente partielle dans un appel d'offres au premier prix

Karine Brisset

Revue économique, 2002, vol. 53, issue 1, 29-41

Abstract: This paper deals with collusive behavior among a subset of bidders in a first price sealed-bid auction. The analysis shows that cartel?s bid is always less aggressive than outsiders? bids, when outsiders are aware or not from the presence of a collusion. We prove that the first price auction gives the auctioneer a greater expected revenue than the second price auction in the presence of an incomplete collusion when outsiders are not aware from the collusion. Classification JEL : D44, D82.

JEL-codes: D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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