Protection endogène des biens intermédiaires en agence commune

Estelle Dhont-Peltrault

Revue économique, 2002, vol. 53, issue 3, 459-468

Abstract: Using influence-driven approach developed by Grossman and Helpman [1994], we show that the level and the structure of protection rates that emerge in the political equilibrium depend on the nature of the contribution schedules made by lobbies. Whereas in some cases tariff escalation occurs due to consumer goods counter-lobbying, intermediate goods may however be better protected than consumer goods in the political equilibrium. Classification JEL : F13, D72

JEL-codes: D72 F13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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