Interdépendances financières et dilemme de politique monétaire. La Banque de France entre 1880 et 1913

Rémy Contamin

Revue économique, 2003, vol. 54, issue 1, 157-179

Abstract: This article is a contribution to the existing literature focused on the stability of the classical gold exchange standard. Thus, it aims at explaining how the French Central Bank managed, between 1880 and 1913, to soften the tensions induced by international financial shocks. Until 1901, the use of the well known « gold devices » made it possible to depreciate the exchange rate to a much larger extent than it would have been feasible under a pure gold exchange system. But this policy was fiercely questioned among the private bankers who were also regents of the Bank, as they argued that it fostered a loss of confidence in the currency. It was then left over and gradually supplanted by direct intervention on English monetary markets, whose role was to soften financial tensions at their roots, instead of widening the fluctuation margin of the exchange rate. Classification JEL : N 23, N 13, E 58

Date: 2003
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