L'incidence des régimes de responsabilité environnementale sur les comportements de prévention et d'assurance des firmes

Sandrine Spaeter

Revue économique, 2004, vol. 55, issue 2, 227-245

Abstract: Firms are often protected by limited liability, which holds them financially liable for an environmental damage only upon their net value. Limited liability may explain the under-investment in prevention by firms and the small demand for pollution insurance. To counterbalance this tendency, the American Congress adopted a harsh environmental legislation in 1980 which extends the (financial) liability to any operator of the pollutant firm, and especially to banks. In the Directive on environmental liability proposed by the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, financial guarantees rather than extended liability are the important point. In this article, we study both liability systems in the light of the results of the economic theory on the impact of extended liability on the behaviors of firms, banks and insurers. Classification JEL : D82, D62, K32, Q2.

JEL-codes: D62 D82 K32 Q2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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