Assurance maladie et risque moral ex ante. L'incidence du type de risque sanitaire

Franck Bien

Revue économique, 2004, vol. 55, issue 3, 479-488

Abstract: This paper investigates the impact of health risk on insurance contract with hazard moral. We use a bi-dimensional utility function (wealth and health status). We prove that the type of health risk influences the equilibrium of insurance market. A full coverage is possible with moral hazard. Finally, the link between health risk and co-payment can be invalided. Classification JEL : D8, I1

JEL-codes: D8 I1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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