Lobbying pour les permis négociables et non-neutralité du mode d'allocation

Julien Hanoteau

Revue économique, 2004, vol. 55, issue 3, 517-525

Abstract: In an agency model of politics, we show that the choice of an allocation method for tradable emissions permits is not neutral. The decision of a ?corrupted? government to auction the permits or to grant them for free affects their equilibrium quantity and price as it modifies the incentive of capital owners of a polluting industry to lobby for or against emissions abatement. Classification JEL : D78, H23, Q28

JEL-codes: D78 H23 Q28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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