Absorption des connaissances et localisation internationale de la R&D des entreprises. Un jeu stratégique

Bernard Franck and Robert Frank Owen

Revue économique, 2005, vol. 56, issue 6, 1207-1226

Abstract: Effective levels of firms? R&D are understood here to depend, at an international scale, on where they are located due to country-specific spillovers of fundamental R&D. A duopoly model is proposed in which each firm is initially located in a different country. Since knowledge is assumed to be complementary between the two countries, there is an incentive for each firm to set up R&D activities abroad, in order to capture additional R&D spillovers. A game-theoretic framework highlights outcomes, wherein both firms will localize R&D activities abroad, but it is collectively unprofitable for them to do so. It is shown that non-cooperative intervention by the two countries, in the form of lump-sum taxes on foreign entry, may eliminate such a Prisoners? Dilemma. Classification JEL : F15, F23, O3.

JEL-codes: F15 F23 O3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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