La gestion contractuelle des services publics. Une critique de l'approche par les droits de propriété

Claudine Desrieux

Revue économique, 2008, vol. 59, issue 3, 451-461

Abstract: This paper deals with efficient organizational choices for the provision of public services. To better apprehend observed contracts of public-private partnerships (ppps), we depart from the property rights literature to distinguish between ownership, rights to make ex post decisions, and rights to perceive residual benefits. Indeed, such rights can be temporarily transferred to a private firm, even if ownership of the assets remains public. Hence, such a separation allows to analyse the large continuum of contracts from full private to full public management. Under some conditions, our results show that there is always a degree of private involvement that is socially efficient. Classification JEL : D23, L33, H4, H11

JEL-codes: D23 H11 H4 L33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cairn.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=RECO_593_0451 (application/pdf)
http://www.cairn.info/revue-economique-2008-3-page-451.htm (text/html)
free

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_593_0451

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Revue économique from Presses de Sciences-Po
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jean-Baptiste de Vathaire ().