Hedge funds: la fin du laissez-faire

Michel Aglietta and Sandra Rigot

Revue économique, 2009, vol. 60, issue 3, 693-702

Abstract: Hedge fund performance has collapsed while the financial crisis has been worsening. Indeed, hedge funds are part of the shadow banking system that is at the heart of the crisis. They embody all the weaknesses that have engineered the mess: excess leverage, opaque activities, illusory alpha, perverse incentives. Hedge fund regulation is long overdue. But it must be part of a comprehensive overhaul of market finance. Overseeing the recommendations of professional organisations, regulatory authorities and international institutions against our risk analysis, we emphasize two principles of future regulatory reforms: reinforcing indirect regulation to limit excessive leverage of hedge funds and enhancing market discipline in order to reduce information asymmetries and discard perverse incentives relative to the fees structure of hedge funds managers. Classification JEL : G23

JEL-codes: G23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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