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L'enchère à offres payantes. Un mécanisme aux applications diverses

Olivier Bos

Revue économique, 2011, vol. 62, issue 1, 5-28

Abstract: There is a wide and dynamic literature on all-pay auctions in both complete and incomplete information. This paper provides a survey of the main insights from the literature. In many situations all-pay auctions illustrate economic, social and political issues which are similar to a contest. Recent papers show that all-pay auctions could be used at raising money for charity. Classification JEL : D44, D62

JEL-codes: D44 D62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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