La fourniture de biens publics par un gouvernement à deux niveaux

Pierre Boyer

Revue économique, 2011, vol. 62, issue 3, 521-530

Abstract: We study public good provision by a two-tier government. Citizens are privately informed about their tastes for the public good provided with respect to the head of the government, a benevolent social planner. The second tier, composed by bureaucrats, has some information about those preferences. We show how the additional information provided by the bureaucrats and the possibility of collusion between bureaucrats and some groups of citizens affect the public good quantity provided. Classification JEL : D73 ; D82 ; H41.

JEL-codes: H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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