Un contrat à obligation d'exécution peut-il résoudre le problème du hold-up ?

M'hand Fares

Revue économique, 2011, vol. 62, issue 3, 545-555

Abstract: This paper aims to define the conditions under which a specific performance contract can solve the hold-up problem. We mainly show two results. First, in a very general environment the efficient solution is achieved only with renegotiation design. Second, in a specific environment where the valuation functions satisfy a separability condition, the efficient solution is implemented only because there is an equivalence result between this condition and a state independence assumption. This implies that a specific performance contrat is unecessary since a volontary contract is also able to achieve efficiency. Classification JEL : D23, D86, K12, L14

JEL-codes: D23 D86 K12 L14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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