Autorisation à l'échange sur des externalités. De l'interdiction à l'obligation

Élodie Bertrand

Revue économique, 2014, vol. 65, issue 2, 439-459

Abstract: Negotiation over externalities, as assumed by the ?Coase theorem,? may be impeded by a moral or social ban on exchanging this type of property right. This article shows that the empirical tests of the ?Coase theorem? bring to light three degrees on the spectrum of the moral or social authorization to legitimately exchange externalities : 1) a ban among rural neighbors observed by Ellickson [1986], 2) a permission between the beekeepers and orchard owners studied by Cheung [1973] and 3) a moral incentive in the lab experiments of Hoffman and Spitzer [1982]. This paper thus contributes to the analysis of the interaction between social norms and exchange contracts, by focusing on norms that allow or not contracts. Classification JEL : B25 ; C91 ; D62 ; K13

JEL-codes: K13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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