La collusion dans les firmes

Kouroche Vafaï

Revue économique, 2015, vol. 66, issue 4, 687-702

Abstract: This paper studies collusion inside firms, one of the main themes of the economics of organizations. When a principal employs a supervisor to obtain information about an agent, the hierarchical agency relationship is exposed to the formation of coalitions in order to hide information. We extend the frame of the standard model of collusion in firms where only supervisor/agent collusion is considered by also including the possibility of principal/supervisor collusion. A firm may choose to deter both forms of collusion, allow both of them, or deter one of them and allow the other one. We show that it is not optimal to allow collusion in firms, that is, the optimal policy of a hierarchical firm exposed to multiple forms of collusion is to deter them all. The paper then investigates the structural consequences of the exposure of firms to collusion. Classification JEL : D02 ; D20 ; D82 ; H11 ; L20.

JEL-codes: L20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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