L’économie comme science et les jugements de valeur politiques. Myrdal et sa thèse initiale de neutralité

Nicolas Barbaroux and Michel Bellet

Revue économique, 2017, vol. 68, issue 2, 219-247

Abstract: The methodological thesis presented in Gunnar Myrdal?s 1930 book is unrecognized, unlike his well-known later thesis that argues economic theory incorporates value judgments (strong non-neutrality position). The former thesis seems close to Lionel Robbins? famous analysis (1932) because a neutrality position is claimed. Its foundations are rooted in Axel Hägerström?s Swedish philosophy, with non-cognitivism and emotivism hypotheses. Myrdal uses this philosophy to separate economic science and political value judgments incorporated in practical economic policies. However from this free-value science, he proposes to legitimate a scientific intervention in practical views with an intermediate ?technology of economics? which would study the different complexes of emotions, interests and institutional set-ups in relation with value judgments. The presentation of Myrdal?s initial position opens up some new hypotheses concerning the evolution of his interpretation (from weak neutrality to ambiguous weak non-neutrality).

Date: 2017
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