L’exclusion comme levier d’incitation à la provision de biens publics ?

Jocelyn Groff and Anne Rozan

Revue économique, 2019, vol. 70, issue 6, 1115-1123

Abstract: Exclusion appears to be a good incentive in order to increase contributions to the public good as it excludes from the benefits the free-riders (Swope [2002]). We investigate experimentally whether exclusion leads to increased performance in linear public goods, when membership is very low. Our result shows that in our case the existence of exclusion does not succeed in increasing cooperation. This unexpected result is paradoxically supported by Bchir and Willinger [2012] who found that at a high threshold level, the membership fee no longer ensures successful provision. Classification JEL : C92, H41.

Keywords: public good; exclusion; membership fee; coordination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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