Cumul des mandats et subventions allouées aux communes

Brice Fabre

Revue économique, 2021, vol. 72, issue 5, 799-842

Abstract: This paper brings new evidence on the politics of intergovernmental grants, by focusing on multiple office-holding (cumul des mandat). I look at whether a local incumbent who has concurrently a seat at an upper layer of government gets more funds from this layer. I focus on grants counties (départements) allocate to municipalities. I find that mayors who also have a seat in the majority group of the county council get on average 28% more grants for their municipality than other municipal incumbents. Additional evidence suggest this targeting being driven by reelection concerns of county councillors.

Keywords: intergovernmental transfers; multiple office-holding; regression discontinuity design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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