Propriété intellectuelle et politique de concurrence. Le cas des accords de type « pay-for-delay »

Béatrice Dumont

Revue économique, 2016, vol. 67, issue HS1, 111-124

Abstract: This article reviews the recent literature on the so-called ?pay-for-delay agreements,? a form of patent dispute settlement agreement in which a generic manufacturer acknowledges the patent of an originator pharmaceutical company and agrees to refrain from marketing its generic product for a specific period of time. In return, the generic company receives a consideration in the form of a payment from the originator. After a presentation of the evaluation grid that is made of these agreements combining intellectual property and competition issues, we examine to which extent the use by the competition authorities of a truncated analysis based on the size of payments really helps to shed light on the most likely anti-competitive agreements or, conversely, if this is equivalent to the way a drunk uses a lamppost, namely for support rather than illumination. Classification JEL : K21, L41, 034.

JEL-codes: K21 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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