Effets de réputation dans les enchères: l’inégalité des perdants

Olivier Bos and Tom Truyts

Revue économique, 2021, vol. 72, issue 3, 443-458

Abstract: We study a symmetric private values model in which all the bidding ranks are used by an outside observer to infer the bidders’ types. In the class of sealed-bid auctions, we establish the revenue equivalence and determine the optimal auction, which requires an entry fee to extract all surplus from the lowest types. We provide a first reply about the optimal disclosure policy for the size of the bidding ranks. Moreover, there is no strategical equivalence anymore between the second-price auction and the English auction. Our results are useful for art auction houses and charity auctions.

Keywords: optimal auction; information disclosure; art auction; charity auction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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