 Le système bancaire de l'ombre: fruit d'une régulation bancaire trop pesante ou véritable rôle économique ?Axelle Arquié Revue d'économie financière, 2013, vol. N° 109, issue 1, 69-84 Abstract: The rise of the shadow banking system (SBS), providing liquidity and credit as a classic bank, raises theoretical questions regarding the rationale behind its apparition. Is it a mere response to banking regulation that would have eroded bank profitability or does it have a distinct economic function? There is empirical evidence that banking regulation has led to some regulatory trade-off and has impacted the size of the SBS, but this system does have a specific economic role of its own. It allows for a better risk diversification due to the theoretical advantages linked to securitization. But the reality of this diversification has empirically been challenged after the 2007-2008 crisis. The economic function of the SBS also relies on the very nature of its liabilities, which offer institutional investors, in search of short-term safe deposits, and who are not entitled to deposit insurance which is reserved to households, a form of deposit insurance through collateralized debt issued by these structures, protection which nevertheless remains subject to variation of the collateral value on financial markets. Classification JEL: G21, G23, G24, G28. JEL-codes: G21 G23 G24 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cai:refaef:ecofi_109_0069 Access Statistics for this article More articles in Revue d'économie financière from Association d'économie financière |
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