Les conséquences fiscales du programme d'achat d'obligations de la BCE

Paul De Grauwe and Yuemei Ji ()

Revue d'économie financière, 2014, vol. N° 113, issue 1, 47-60

Abstract: The perception that the government bond buying program (OMT) announced by the ECB may lead to future tax burdens on countries, in particular on Germany, is based on an erroneous application of solvency principles that apply to private agents, but not to central banks. We argue that the creditor nations? taxpayers, in particular the German taxpayers, will receive tax revenue from the implementation of the OMT. We also measure the size of the bond-buying program that is compatible with price stability. It turns out that this estimate critically depends on whether the Eurozone stays in a liquidity trap situation or not. Today, as the Eurozone is still in a liquidity trap there is no limit to the amount of government bonds the ECB can buy without triggering inflation. Classification JEL: E58, E63, F36, G01.

JEL-codes: E58 E63 F36 G01 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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