Les banques centrales peuvent-elles mener des politiques non conventionnelles tout en conservant leur indépendance ?

Niels Thygesen

Revue d'économie financière, 2014, vol. N° 113, issue 1, 179-192

Abstract: In the course of the 1970s and 80s, central banks became focused on price stability as a prime objective, and they were given more independence to assure such a mandate. Both developments grew out of practical experience combined with a new perspective on macroeconomic theory. The design of the ECB is a prime example; steps were taken to explicitly exclude objectives and/or instruments that might have distracted the ECB. After 2008 central banks in the US, the UK and Japan embarked on unconventional policies ? massive purchases of securities and guidance to markets about future policy actions ? in order to get around their inability to lower the short-term policy rate further; this brought them closer to governments, though as yet without any formal change in their independence. The ECB has not followed suit; the heterogeneity of the participants in the Euro area has made unconventional policies less useful or outright impossible. Classification JEL: E58, F36.

JEL-codes: E58 F36 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cairn.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=ECOFI_113_0179 (application/pdf)
http://www.cairn.info/revue-d-economie-financiere-2014-1-page-179.htm (text/html)
free

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cai:refaef:ecofi_113_0179

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Revue d'économie financière from Association d'économie financière
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jean-Baptiste de Vathaire ().