Médecine personnalisée, tests génétiques et assurance santé: une tension exacerbée entre antisélection et discrimination des risques

David Bardey and Philippe De Donder

Revue d'économie financière, 2017, vol. N° 126, issue 2, 201-212

Abstract: Weare currently witnessing the emergence of personalized medicine, defined as the use of genetic information to better tailor individual diagnostic, prevention and treatment decisions. These medical and technological advances make it necessary to think through their consequences on health insurance markets. One major decision consists in deciding whether the information generated by genetic tests should be shared with health insurers. This article first discusses the economic consequences of such a sharing of genetic information: risk discrimination if the information is not shared, and adverse selection if it is. We then discuss four different types of regulation of genetic information which are used around the world. We then present the main results of a recent study we have undertaken, which compares (using both a theoretical and an experimental viewpoint) two such regulations. We conclude with a few suggestions for further research. Classification JEL : C91, D82, G22, I18.

JEL-codes: C91 D82 G22 I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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