Connaissance commune et consensus

Lucie Ménager

Revue d'économie industrielle, 2006, vol. n° 114-115, issue 2, 4-4

Abstract: In a seminal paper, Aumann [1976] showed that if agents have common knowledge of their posterior probabilities of some event, then these posteriors must be the same, provided that they have the same prior probability. This result has given rise to a vast literature about the implications of common knowledge for consensus. The aim of this paper is first to present how knowledge and common knowledge are modelled in economic analysis. Then we review some extensions of Aumann?s agreement theorem.

Keywords: Common Knowledge; Consensus. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cairn.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=REI_114_0004 (application/pdf)
http://www.cairn.info/revue-d-economie-industrielle-2006-2-page-4.htm (text/html)
free

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cai:reidbu:rei_114_0004

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Revue d'économie industrielle from De Boeck Université
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jean-Baptiste de Vathaire ().