Pseudo-génériques et fusions « stratégiques » dans l'industrie du médicament

Laurent Granier and Sébastien Trinquard

Revue d'économie industrielle, 2007, vol. n° 117, issue 1, 2-2

Abstract: This paper fills the gap in the theoretical literature concerning mergers between brand-name and generic laboratories in pharmaceutical markets. To prevent generic firms from increasing their market share, some brand-name firms produce generics themselves, called pseudo-generics. We show, in a duo-poly model with substitutable goods, in which a brand-name firm and a generic firm compete à la Cournot, that a brand-name company always has an incentive to purchase its competitor, and often, an incentive to produce pseudo-generics.

Keywords: Endogenous Mergers; Pharmaceutical Market; Pseudo-Generics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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