L'évolution de la théorie des contrats incomplets face à la dé-intégration verticale

Olivier Sautel

Revue d'économie industrielle, 2007, vol. n° 117, issue 1, 5-5

Abstract: This paper builds upon confrontation of contractual theory of the firm based on Hart et Moore (1990) with recent evidences on vertical disintegration of value chains. We identify a progressive redefinition of nature and role of the firm in these theories. Ownership are no more required for incentives alignment. More than asset?s ownership portfolio, firms become active players in coordination of specialization and task division, wich permit to explain coordination beyond hierarchy, in inter-firms relationships.

Keywords: Incomplete Contract Theory; Outsourcing; Property Rights; Task Division (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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