Taxe, subvention et coût fixe d’entrée: oligopole de Cournot avec entrée endogène

Bocar Samba Ba

Revue d'économie industrielle, 2019, vol. n° 165, issue 1, 117-134

Abstract: ?We consider an endogenous two-period Cournot oligopoly where several similar firms extract and sell a polluting resource and pay tax on each unit produced. In the second period, they compete with other similar firms that recycle one part of the previous extracted quantity. These firms must pay a fixed cost to enter the market. After entering, they receive a subsidy from a benevolent regulator, due to recycling being considered a green activity. Our results are as follows: First, the combination of taxation, subsidy, and fixed cost enables the social optimum to be restored. Second, the implementation of these policies may be financially profitable for the regulator, under some conditions. Third, the levels of the taxes, the subsidy, and the fixed cost depend on whether the elasticities of demand are finite numbers or not. ? JEL classification: L13, L72, Q56, Q58.

Keywords: tax; subsidy; Cournot oligopoly; endogenous entry; fixed cost (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 L72 Q56 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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